INTERMARRIAGE ATTITUDES AMONG MINORITY AND MAJORITY GROUPS IN WESTERN EUROPE: THE ROLE OF ATTACHMENT TO THE RELIGIOUS IN-GROUP

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Abstract
The key question of this paper is whether social integration, both for minority (migrants) and majority groups (natives) in Western Europe, varies across contexts of exit (ethnic origins) and contexts of reception (Western European countries); and if so, how does religious identity and practice serve to mediate these contextual differences? To investigate this question I draw on the international comparative dataset EURISLAM which includes comparisons between Muslim migrants of ex-Yugoslav, Turkish, Moroccan and Pakistani origin with majority group members of Belgium, Britain, Germany and Switzerland. Social integration is measured through attitudes towards intermarriage across Muslim/non-Muslim lines. As results show, ethnic groups differ in their probabilities to approve of intermarriage. Especially migrants from the former Yugoslavia encounter a significantly lower approval of intermarriage by natives. However, approval of intermarriage is closely tied to religiosity. Once religiosity is controlled for, all migrant groups become significantly more positive about intermarriage than natives. Following theories on in-group favouritism and the homophily principle, we find that religious identity among migrants and practice among both natives and migrants are associated with reluctance to intermarry. Policy makers are advised to take note that contextual differences in perceived social integration of immigrant groups could be confounding other factors, including how differences in religiosity affect social integration.

Keywords: social integration; intermarriage; religiosity; Islam; Western Europe

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INTRODUCTION

At the outset of this paper stands the question if in-group attachment is inextricably linked to out-group rejection and lower degrees of social integration which is often conceptualized as interethnic friendships and marriages (Friedrichs and Jagodzinski 1999). This topic is of great importance, especially against the backdrop that intergroup contact has a positive effect on structural integration (e.g. Meng and Gregory 2009). Migrants from the studied countries suffer economic inequalities accompanied from tensions between groups, resulting in discrimination and xenophobia (European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia 2003). This in turn threatens the social cohesion of societies and alienates its members from one another.

Following the theory on in-group favouritism, this study investigates the extent to which individuals are willing to intermingle with out-group members and poses the question whether in-group orientation, in this case measured by religious attachment, goes along with out-group rejection, captured by the attitude towards marriages between Muslim migrants and non-Muslim natives. Marriage outside of one’s ethnic or religious group, hereafter called intermarriage, is regarded as the most intimate link between groups and is thus the strongest measure of social integration (Kalmijn 1998).

While numerous studies have investigated intermarriage behavior, only a few studies have used survey data to analyse attitudes towards intermarriage (e.g. Huijnk 2011; Hindriks, Coenders, and Verkuyten 2011; Tolsma, Lubbers, and Coenders 2008; Bisin et al. 2007). Attitudinal measures have an advantage over behavioural measures as they do not depend on the availability of opportunities compared to intermarriage. Furthermore, they can help to broaden our knowledge as they allow to spot gaps between behaviour and attitudes, meaning whether for instance lower rates of intermarriage can be explained by reluctance to intermarry or are a result of others factors such as opportunities.

Taking the case of intermarriage, recent studies indicate that intermarriage is not only a matter of opportunities, but that another mechanism must be at work. Even when opportunity structures and socio-demographic variables are controlled for in the analysis of intermarriage, rates remain lower compared to intramarriages (Lucassen and Laarman 2009). This finding runs contrary to the prediction of early assimilation theorists (e.g. Gordon 1964), who expected a decrease of differences between migrants and receiving societies over time; however, different rates of social integration can vary by conditions in both contexts of exit
(cultural views for different minority groups) and contexts of reception (boundary making by natives).

The context of reception is shaped by policies that regulate immigrant integration including religiosity. Nation states’ policies follow different strategies of immigrant integration. These strategies range from exclusionary policies on one end to active encouragement at the other end with passive acceptance as an intermediary strategy. The latter is characterized by granting immigrants access without supporting the integration process (Portes and Rumbaut 2006: 86). These strategies, in turn, are expected to affect individuals’ receptivity (See Connor 2010). Therefore I address the question, what differences in attitudes towards intermarriage exist between natives and migrants on the whole, natives and migrants across different receiving societies, and finally between different migrant origins themselves?

Recent studies rather indicate vitality in terms of preferences to marry members of the same ethnic origin, especially among groups that are regarded as distinctive in terms of religiosity and values (e.g. Huijnk 2011). Consequently, the question is, to what extent are religious attachment (e.g. identity, practice) and intermarriage attitudes compatible? In other words, can contextual differences in intermarriage attitudes be explained by religiosity, both for native and migrant populations?

Research related to intermarriage typically uses ethnic origin as a proxy to distinguish different religious groups (Lucassen and Laarman 2009) without being able to draw on direct measures of religiosity and values. This paper will make use of such measures by relying on the international comparative dataset EURISLAM². This unique data source includes natives (from Belgium, Britain, Germany, and Switzerland) as well as migrants (from the former Yugoslavia, Morocco, Turkey and Pakistan) in the same four Western European countries. The cross-national nature of the dataset, both in terms of contexts of reception and exit, allows us to view contextual differences regarding social integration and how individual levels of religiosity are a vehicle for these differences, particularly among nation states that accommodate different religions. Especially the accommodation of Islam has received increasing importance in scientific studies (e.g. Connor 2010; Fleischmann and Phalet 2011) and recent political debates on migrant religiosity.

The paper is structured as follows: A theoretical framework is outlined which builds on theories on migrant’s integration, in-group favouritism, prejudice and homophily to
elaborate hypotheses followed by a short overview of migrants from the former Yugoslavia, Morocco, Turkey and Pakistan before the derived hypotheses are tested.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES

In regard to immigrant integration, the concept of assimilation has been central in the scientific debates for the last decades. Scholars from the Chicago school proposed that migrants are inevitably incorporated into receiving societies across generations and ultimately reach the stage where all in-group traits diminish over time. Gordon (1964) terms this acculturation. This, he says, will inevitably go along with cross-group relationships and finally the replacement of social distance with cultural solidarity. Park defined social distance as “[…] the grades and degrees of understanding and intimacy which characterize personal and social relations generally” (1924: 339). Indicators of social distance embrace attitudes towards intermarriage next to other relationships such as friendships. Led by Park’s theoretical discussion on social distance, Bogardus (1933) developed an instrument to assess social distance, in which attitudes towards marriage were the strongest measure of social distance.

Later notions of immigrant incorporation take into account that this process does not necessarily have to be a one-directional path, but can affect receiving societies as well, involving boundary blurring (Zolberg and Woon 1999). Assimilation theory would lead us to expect that younger generations are more open to traversing cross-group boundaries than older generations. Yet, precisely this hypothesis has been challenged by scholars who argue that ethnic belonging, in particular religious beliefs and practices, can also be revitalized (Cf. Yancey, Ericksen, and Juliani 1976) and provide the feeling of continuity through by-passing experiences of discontinuity in the stage after immigration (Herberg 1983 [1960]).

The feelings and adaptive strategies of migrants can be reinforced in response to social exclusion experienced as a result of state integration policies and the attitudes of the receiving society towards minorities (Bourhis et al. 1997). Connor’s (2010) results revealed that less welcoming contexts are associated with higher levels of Islamic religiosity and thus allude to reactive effects. According to Koopmans et al.’s (2012) indicators on the accommodation of Islam, the most unconducive accommodation of Islam can be found in Switzerland where the strict French-like secularism does not formally recognize Islam (Pfaff-Czarnecka 2009). The
United Kingdom, by contrast, has been one of the pioneers in accommodating Islam, such as funding Islamic schools. Belgium and Germany became more generous over time, but still occupy intermediate positions between these two poles. Germany recognizes only Christian and Jewish denominations as public corporations and reserves the privilege to levy religious taxes and organize religious education classes in state schools only for the aforementioned religions (Fetzer and Soper 2005). Belgium, on the contrary, has officially recognized Islam since 1974 (Chaves and Cann 1992) and allows the state funding of religious education in public schools. However, in regard to religious symbols in public institutions, it retains a more classical, French position of *laïcité*. From the main thrust of the literature on nation states’ immigrant accommodation and the ethnic revitalization hypothesis, attitudes towards intermarriage among migrants and natives alike will be more positive in more accommodative contexts (*H1*).

Intermarriage across religious lines also necessitates the investigation of differences between various countries of origin, which differ from each other in regard to its religious and cultural traits. According to Inglehart and Norris (2009), people living in Morocco and Pakistan are more attached to their religion than people in Turkey and hold even stronger religious beliefs than people from Bosnia. People living in Belgium, Britain, Germany and Switzerland on the contrary, hold fewer religious beliefs. Thus we should expect the greatest approval of intermarriage of migrants from the former Yugoslavia compared to all other groups and the least approval by Turkish migrants followed lastly by Moroccan and Pakistani migrants (*H2*).

Moving from contextual influences to individual religiosity, scholars emphasize that religious attachment and identification strengthen the cohesion of the in-group (Kalmijn 1998) – a crucial factor in the evaluation of out-groups as proposed by social identity theory (Turner 1999). Sumner (1906) hypothesized already in the early 20th century that stronger group identification is accompanied by negative out-group attitudes. Yet, if the in-group does not contribute significantly to the self-categorization, the out-group does not pose a threat. Empirically, Hindriks, Coenders and Verkuyten (2011) discovered that stronger in-group identification relative to out-group identification can go along with greater social distance. In keeping with social identity theory and the revitalization hypothesis, religious affiliation can endure in the life-course of migrants; therefore, it is expected that in-group religious identification goes along with out-group rejection (*H3a*). Next to religious identity, the effect of religion can also emanate from religious practice. Hujink (2011) and Hindriks, Coenders
and Verkuyten (2011) found support for an increased reluctance to intermarry among more religious people. Therefore, I will test if a decreased approval of intergroup marriages is associated with higher levels of religious practice (H3b).

However, Allport (1979 [1954]) alleged that the attachment to one’s own group does not necessarily lead to negative attitudes towards out-groups, but rather depends on perceived threats. It is important to distinguish different types of threat. The most prominent theory on threat is the theory on realistic threat, when two groups are in competition for scarce resources (Sherif and Sherif 1969). Beyond that, symbolic threats, which arise out of perceived group differences in values, norms and beliefs, have also been recognized as threatening (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007). Perceived realistic and symbolic threat, in turn, are interwoven with perceived differences as has been corroborated by Osch and Breugelmans (2011), who concluded that perceived intergroup difference is an organizing principle of intercultural attitudes. Consequently, I consider the perceived difference in regard to the role of religion next to the actual religiosity as determinants of approval of intermarriage. Studies by Dunbar et al. (2000) and Biernat et al. (1996) have also shown that the perceived gap between in-group and out-group values increased negative out-group attitudes and stereotypes. Furthermore, proposed by the concept of homophily, we like to interact with people who are more similar to ourselves in respect to religion (McPherson et al. 2001). Taking a cue from integrated threat theory and the concept of homophily, I argue that greater perceived differences with regard to the role of religion in society engender a lower likelihood to approve of intergroup marriages (H4).

IMMIGRANTS IN BELGIUM, BRITAIN, GERMANY AND SWITZERLAND

In Belgium, Britain, Germany, and Switzerland, migration from countries with a Muslim majority makes up a significant proportion of migrants.

--Table 1 about here--
The number of migrants from the former Yugoslavia, Turkey, Morocco and Pakistan differs between countries as can be seen from Table 1. In Belgium Moroccans and Turks are more present, in Germany Turks, ex-Yugoslavs and Moroccans, in Switzerland ex-Yugoslavs and Turks and in Britain mostly Pakistan.

The first post-war migration flows from countries with large Muslim populations started in the late 1950s and early 1960s with guest-workers especially from Turkey, ex-Yugoslavia and Morocco in Belgium, Germany and Switzerland (Bade and Oltmer 2007; Caestecker 2007; Vuilleumier 2007). Swiss guest-worker migration started later than in Germany.

While Germany concluded treaties with Turkey in 1961, one year later with Morocco and in 1968 with the former Yugoslavia (Bundeszentrale fuer politische Bildung n.d.) in order to recruit guest-workers, Swiss guest-worker migration from Turkey and ex-Yugoslavia started in the late 1960s (Lathion 2010). After a recruitment stop, migration generally took the form of family reunification. Some migrants from ex-Yugoslavia, Pakistan and Turkey came also as political refugees. Refugees from Pakistan, especially in Germany, often belong to the Ahmadiyya community which has been persecuted by the Pakistani government. The highest influx of Pakistani migrants in Germany took place in the late 1970s (Statistisches Bundesamt 2011).

In the United Kingdom, migration from Pakistan became more prominent in the 1950s after the independence of Pakistan. They came primarily as workers. Until the early 1960s Pakistani were as members of the Commonwealth free to enter the country (Hansen 2000). Migration from Pakistan was accompanied by Turkish migration starting in the mid 1950s and Moroccan migration in the 1960s (Lunn 2007). Turkish migrants who came in the ‘50s were mainly from Cyprus, which became independent from Britain at that time. This wave was followed by single male workers in the early 1970s and another wave in the 1980s during the military coup in Turkey and with Kurdish refugees from south-eastern Turkey in the late 1980s (King et al. 2008).

Hence, differences between groups cannot only be expected for different migration reasons, but also different political backgrounds. While Turkey is known as having promoted laicism and Yugoslavia was ruled by socialists during the last century and has among the origin countries of the studied groups the lowest value on Inglehart’s und Norris’ (2009) religiosity scale, Pakistan and Morocco define themselves officially as Islamic countries that at least partly apply the Islamic law, manifested in the Sharia. This paper will therefore
distinguish different Muslim groups and investigate the extent to which the attitudes towards non-Muslims differ according to both the ethnic background and countries of residence.

DATA, VARIABLES AND METHODS

Data
To analyze the abovementioned hypotheses, I draw on the EURISLAM survey. The data were collected through Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews between January and December 2011. The survey oversampled persons with a migration background. Over 1,000 interviews were completed in each country (former Yugoslav, Turkish, Moroccan, and Pakistani). Using the latest available electronic phonebooks, the migrant sample was drawn by an onomastic procedure Humpert and Schneiderheinze (2000), whereby potential respondents were selected by common ex-Yugoslav, Moroccan, Turkish and Pakistani family names. Migrants were screened if they or at least one of the parents had a Muslim and the required ethnic background. For the native comparison group (individuals whose parents and grandparents were born in the residence country), a random sample was drawn. Migrant survey interviewers were bilingual and respondents could choose between the language of the country of residence or of their country of origin.

Variables
The dependent variable, attitude towards intermarriage, was measured by the question “If a Muslim (question for natives) /non-Muslim (question for Muslims) married a close relative of yours, would you find that pleasant, would it not make a difference or would you find that unpleasant?” The variable was recoded to a binary variable with the categories ‘accepting’ (‘pleasant’ and ‘would not make a difference’, Migrants 74% and Natives 75%) and ‘rejection’ (‘unpleasant’).

The main independent variables are contexts of exit and reception, religious identification, frequency of prayer and other religious practices. Country and ethnic group dummies are used as proxies for the accommodation of Islam/ receptiveness to migrants (contexts of reception) and countries of origin (contexts of exit).
Religious identification is measured by means of two variables ‘To what extent do you see yourself as Muslim (Mean 3.68, SD 1.11)/ Christian (Mean 2.98, SD 1.02)?’ and ‘To what extent are you proud of being a Muslim (Mean 4.05, SD 1.15)/ Christian (Mean 3.01, SD 1.08), which were measured on a scale varying from one (not at all) to five (very strongly). To avoid multi-collinearity, the average of the two items was used since both items correlate 0.6 within the native population and 0.7 among migrants.

Religious practice is measured by the frequency of prayer -- a more gender- and group-neutral measure compared to religious attendance that is less frequent among Muslim women (Wunn 2008). Furthermore, praying does not depend on the availability of a place of worship, sometimes unavailable in some regions. Frequency of prayer is based on a scale from one (never), to five (several times a day) (Migrants: Mean 3.04, SD 1.61; Natives: Mean 2.19, SD 1.18). A separate variable for religious practice is measured by the questions if respondents cover their hair (for women) (Migrants: 30%; Natives: 0%), wear religious symbols (Migrants: 14%; Natives: 8%), abstain from alcohol (Migrants: 61%; Natives: 3%), follow certain dietary rules (Migrants: 74%; Natives: 8%) or refrain from certain activities on religious holidays (Migrants: 53%; Natives: 15%). All questions have binary responses (1-0); therefore, the row mean was used.

Perceived distance is measured by the item how different the respondents perceive themselves compared to Muslims living in the receiving society (question for natives) (Mean 3.30, SD 0.83)/ compared to natives (question for Muslims) (Mean 2.94, SD 0.94) in how they think about the role of religion in society, ranging from one (very similar) to four (very different).

Control variables include gender (male dummy), age/generation (in-between and second generation dummies for migrants), marital status (married dummy), education in years, and problems with the residence country language (ranging from one: never to five: always).

Method

To explore the role of the independent variables that mediate differences in attitudes towards intermarriage in differing contexts of exit and reception, linear probability models (LPM) with robust standard errors using the Full Information Maximum likelihood estimator were used. The Full-Maximum Likelihood Estimator (FIML) includes incomplete data records in the estimation procedure (Enders 2010), which increases the number of cases included in the model and achieves comparable results to ordinary logistic regressions. According to Mood...
LPM has an advantage over odds and log-odds, because the estimated effects can be compared across groups and models. Log-odds ratios also mirror unobserved heterogeneity arising from omitted variables and are not comparable across models as unobserved heterogeneity can also differ across models. To put it another way, the estimates in the model always depend on the other included variables and their variances in the model even though they might be uncorrelated. This leaves us with incorrect conclusions about the size of the effect. However, coefficients obtained by linear probability models indicate the conditional probability that the outcome variable equals 1, given x.

RESULTS

The independent variables are added to each model in a step-wise fashion. Overall, six models are estimated (Table 2). The first two models compare migrants and natives in order to draw conclusions regarding the level of social distance. The first model contains only socio-demographic, group and country-level variables to control for composition effects, as migrants from the same country of origin may be very different in one country of residence compared to another. By contrast, the second model comprises the different religiosity measures to grasp the influence of religiosity. In addition, the models for natives and migrants are estimated separately in order to tease out whether religion behaves similarly in both groups.

Before delving into the research question and hypothesis testing, I will briefly mention some general findings on the characteristics of the sample investigated. Regarding generational differences, the second generation is more approving of intermarriage than the first generation. This is in line with what assimilation theories and the secularization hypothesis predict. The in-between generation did only differ significantly from the first generation in Model A for migrants (Model 5) when religiosity was not included in the model which speaks to a greater role of religiosity for the in-between generation. Paralleling migrants’ intergenerational shift, natives of a younger age are also more likely to approve of intermarriage (see Model 3). Across all groups, the effect of education is positive, indicating a greater likelihood of approving of intermarriage with increasing education years (language problems are negatively associated with intermarriage attitudes). However, the importance of education for the approval of intermarriage differs between natives and migrants. For
migrants, education turns out to be related to the degrees of religiosity as it becomes insignificant once the religiosities measures are introduced to the model (Model 6). This finding suggests that religiosity is a central mechanism in the explanation of migrant’s integration. This brings us to the discussion of the effects of religious accommodation and maintained religiosity.

Turning to the first hypothesis, migrants and natives were expected to be more likely to approve of intermarriage in more welcoming policy contexts where Islam is accommodated to a greater extent. We do not find evidence for an effect of the religious accommodation of Muslim minorities. The similarity of Germany and Belgium is in line with the hypothesis and also the greater approval of intermarriage among migrants in Britain (Model 3 and 5). However, natives in Britain who were similarly to migrants expected to be more positive regarding intermarriage are particularly puzzling as it is the most accommodative country in regard to Islamic rights. As analyses reveal (Model 3), they do not differ significantly from German or Belgian natives. Even more puzzling is the Swiss case, which is the least accommodating country, but displays the greatest levels of approval among migrants and natives. Contrary to opponents of multiculturalism assuming that Muslim minorities will be less integrated in countries where difference in terms of religiosity is promoted, the results rather suggest that this is not the case in the sample at hand. In other words, increasing degrees of accommodation of Islam neither support nor do they undermine social proximity between migrants and natives.

Next to the country of residence, the country of origin matters in the explanation of attitudes towards intermarriage; groups differ according to their ethnic background. Figure 1 below displays the gap in migrants’ and natives’ coefficients based on the variables from Model 1. As the lighter bar in Figure 1 below shows, Moroccan and Pakistani migrants have negative coefficients compared to natives, meaning they are less likely to approve of intermarriage compared to natives, while ex-Yugoslav migrants are more positive. From Model 1 it can be concluded, that these differences are also significant whereas the difference between Turkish migrants and natives is not significant. Inglehart and Norris (2009) offer an explanation for the relatively greater gap of Moroccan and Pakistani migrants. According to them, the integration of Muslim migrants is linked to the degrees of religiosity in the countries of origin. As their analyses reveal, people living in Morocco and Pakistan are categorized as highly religious compared to Western Europe and the other countries of origin. But can these group differences really be traced back to differences in the degrees of religiosity? As the
darker bar in Figure 1 illustrates, all migrants hold more positive attitudes towards intermarriage once religiosity is controlled for. This change is significant as can be concluded from Model 2.

--Figure 1 about here--

Now, if we look at migrants and natives in separate models, the introduction of religiosity measures to the model of natives (Model 4) does not affect contextual differences between European countries noticeably whereas it explains differences in the approval of intermarriage between minority groups (Model 6), implying that country of origin influences are at work here. The previously significant lower likelihood of Moroccan migrants compared to ex-Yugoslav migrants becomes insignificant; Turkish and Pakistani migrants who were less likely to approve of intermarriage than ex-Yugoslav migrants are more positive towards intermarriage. If the reference category is changed in the model for migrants (not shown here), Moroccan and Pakistani migrants are in line with Inglehart’s and Norris’ (2009) hierarchy in regard to religiosity less likely to approve of intermarriage than all other groups. To summarize, the ethnic origin translates to a great extent into different levels of religiosity and thus differences in the evaluation of intermarriage.

In a next step, it will be more closely tested whether the different religiosity measures leave marks in individuals’ approval of intermarriage and whether differences between migrants and natives emerge in regard to the importance of religiosity for the approval of intermarriage. Informed by the theory on in-group favouritism, I expected the in-group attachment measured by religious identification and practice to be linked to the rejection of the out-group. By and large, the approval of intermarriage is inextricably linked to religious attachment in the combined model for migrants and natives (Model 2). After closer examination, by looking at the separate models for natives (Model 4) and migrants (Models 6), the effect emanates to some extent from the migrant sample in which all three measures of religious attachment are significantly linked to greater social distance. Among those three measures, religious practice is the strongest predictor of intermarriage attitudes. The effect is unique to migrants and can be ascribed to differing religious rituals that receive greater attention in Islam than European Christianity, e.g. covering the hair or following certain dietary rules. However, if we consider religious practice measures that are a slightly better comparable across the denominations like frequency of prayer, we find that it unfolds to the
same effect for migrants and natives. As Table 2 shows, a standard deviation increase in praying frequency decreases the probability for approval by approximately .02. To summarize, the strength of disapproval intersects with the type of religious practice. And in case of natives, simply aligning oneself with a religious denomination is not significantly linked to disapproval of intermarriage.

The effect of religiosity is not only limited to the actual observance and identity, but also individual cognitions and perceptions. Independent of the ethnic group, the data corroborate the importance of perceived differences in regard to the role of religion in society which increase, in line with hypothesis 4, the feeling of unease with intermarriage. Furthermore, the results provide evidence for the homophily principle in partner preferences.

--Table 2 about here--

CONCLUSION

This research expands upon previous research both methodologically and theoretically. The study adopted a two-sided perspective by combining data of the majority and minority groups and follows the reformulated understanding of assimilation that does not fully impose the integration effort on migrants, but also holds majority groups accountable for boundary blurring (e.g. Zolberg and Woon 1999; Alba and Nee 1997). Moreover, it disentangled the role of actual and perceived difference in terms of religiosity underlining the significance of individual perceptions (Allport 1979), and altering group boundaries measured by the attitudes towards intermarriage. The significant effect of individual perceptions on attitudes underlines the importance of the tone of the public debate, which should emphasize to a greater extent commonalities.

This paper has shown ample evidence for the importance of religiosity for group boundaries when taking into account the different accommodative contexts and origins of migrants. Situating findings in nation-states’ accommodation of Islam, the results contradicted the theoretical assumption that more welcoming contexts are associated with more positive out-group attitudes (Bourhis et al. 1997). Migrants and natives in Switzerland which is the least accommodating country in the present study were significantly more positive about intermarriage than the more accommodating countries Germany, Belgium and Britain. To put
it another way, interpreting these findings against the backdrop of the accommodation of Islam reveals that these policies do not foster negative out-group attitudes or the maintenance of religiosity as separate analyses per country have revealed and therewith counter critics of Islamic accommodation who fear that it leads to an increase in group boundaries. However, Switzerland hosts less migrants from countries that are classified as more religious; migrants from the former Yugoslavia which are considered as less religious (Inglehart and Norris 2009) are overrepresented in Switzerland among the immigrant groups from countries with large Muslim populations (Table 1). This leads us to the next implication of this paper.

From the point of view of ethnic origins, country of origin plays a significant role in immigrant social integration. However, a deteriorating of the coefficients when religiosity measures are included in the model signals that migrants from countries with higher degrees of religiosity such as Pakistan, Morocco and Turkey have greater concerns about intermarriage than migrants from the former Yugoslavia. Also in comparison with natives, slight differences arise. While migrants from the former Yugoslavia and Turkey are more positive than natives (only the coefficient for Yugoslav migrants is significant), migrants from countries with higher degrees of religiosity, in this case Morocco and Pakistan have tendentially lower likelihoods of approval. However, migrants are not necessarily more inclined to disapprove intermarriage than the native population they encounter. In point of fact, they are significantly more prone to approve of intermarriage once religiosity is controlled for. This implies that policy makers conceivably may need to shift attention from migrants to natives and undertake some action in order to enable a greater intercultural understanding for instance by stressing shared values of migrants and natives.

In line with the theory on in-group favouritism, the analysis reveals that ethnic origin is closely tied to religiosity, which ultimately contributes to the emergence of group boundaries between natives and migrants. Furthermore, the lower likelihood of approving of intermarriage with higher degrees of religiosity and greater perceived distance reflects the principle of homophily in spousal preferences. While being an avowing Christian native did not decrease the approval of intermarriage significantly, a stronger in-group orientation of migrants lowered the likelihood to approve of intermarriage significantly. However, the stronger role of religious identification among migrants could also be attributed to a vanishing feeling of belonging in the post-migration stage. Another measure of religiosity, the frequency of praying, on the contrary, did contribute to the rejection of intermarriage for migrants and natives. By contrast, the coefficient of religious practice measuring the refraining from certain
activities has only a significant impact among migrants which is linked to differing rituals between religions.

In the long-run, socio-economic equality is one mechanism that fosters intergroup contact (Alba and Nee 1997). This proved to be relevant to groups that were perceived as distinctive, (e.g. Italians in the US). In this study, an increase in education and a decrease in language problems among minority groups were associated with an increased likelihood of approving of intermarriage. Therefore, policies that strive for equal opportunities in educational attainment should be supported. The study provides compelling evidence for policy makers to look more specifically at the German case which, together with Belgium, lags behind in the approval of intermarriage among migrants. This goes together with the lag of established educational equality between migrants and natives in international comparative perspective (OECD 2006). Therefore, education remains a catalyst to immigrant incorporation as it supports intergroup attitudes and religiosity, although the question of causality between education and religiosity remains to be a task for longitudinal future research.

Acknowledgements
I gratefully acknowledge the financial support for this project by the European Commission’s Seventh Framework Programme (grant number 215863) as well as inspiring and helpful comments by Phillip Connor, Ruud Koopmans, Merlin Schaeffer and Celine Teney on previous drafts.
Notes

1 Participants belonging to the migrant populations did not have to identify themselves as believing Muslims in the present study, as the degree of religiosity is a core variable in the study. Instead, the research population was defined as people with a Muslim background. For pragmatic reasons they will be called ‘Muslim migrants’ in the following.

2 For further information see www.eurislam.eu

3 Allowance of ritual animal slaughtering; allowance of the Islamic call to prayer; number of purpose-built mosques with minarets (calculated per 100,000 Muslims); existence of separate cemeteries or cemetery sections for Muslims; allowance of burial without coffin; number of state-funded Islamic schools (calculated per 100,000 Muslims); share of costs of Islamic schools that is covered by the state; Islamic religious classes in state schools; right of female teachers to wear a headscarf; right of female students in primary and secondary schools to wear a headscarf; Islamic religious programs in public broadcasting; Imams in the military; Imams in prisons; existence and prerogatives of recognized Muslim consultative bodies. A five-level scoring system was used for each indicator, with the score “−1” referring to the most restrictive situation across all countries and all points in time, the score “1” corresponding to the most open configuration and the scores “−0.5”, “0”, and “0.5” applying to intermediary situations. Information was gathered for each country for four different points in time: 1980, 1990, 2002, and 2008.

4 n=152 in Belgium, n=200 in Britain, n=255 in Germany and n=250 in Switzerland

5 n=253 in Belgium, n=350 in Britain, n=355 in Germany and n=281 in Switzerland

6 n=254 in Belgium, n=200 in Britain, n=256 in Germany and n=182 in Switzerland

7 n=144 in Belgium, n=100 in Britain, n=162 in Germany and n=150 in Switzerland

8 n=388 in Belgium, n=385 in Britain, n=390 in Germany and n=384 in Switzerland

9 Descriptive statistics available from the author upon request.

10 If children migrated up to the age of 16 they were defined as in-between generation while the second generation includes only children that were born in the residence country.

11 Alternatively, logistic regression with robust standard errors and Maximum Likelihood estimator were carried out and led exactly to the same results.

12 Controlling for particular religious streams (Alevis, Ahmadiyya), minorities in the countries of origin (Kurds) or individuals who share certain heritages (Berber) among the migrant population does not affect the results. However, Alevis are more likely to approve of intermarriage, Muslim migrants who share the Berber heritage and members of the Ahmadiyya community are less so while Kurdish roots are not a significant predictor (analyses available upon request).
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### TABLES AND FIGURES

*Table 1: Number of Immigrants (foreign nationals plus nationals born in the respective source country, 1999-2002; x1000)*

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Source: OECD [www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/23/34792376.xls](http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/23/34792376.xls); D: only foreign nationals
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<th>(2) All groups (B)</th>
<th>(3) Natives (A)</th>
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Standard errors in parentheses

+ p < 0.10,  * p < 0.05,  ** p < 0.01,  *** p < 0.001
Figure 1: Native-migrant gap in coefficients

Native/Migrant Gap in Intermarriage Attitudes

Yugoslav

Turkish

Moroccan

Pakistani

Conditioned on Religiosity

Not Conditioned on Religiosity